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I. INTRODUCTION
An understanding of unjust enrichment is necessary for a
complete and coherent accounting of civil liability in any jurisdic-
tion. Unfortunately, the current formulation of unjust enrichment,
as the basis of liability for and measurement of restitution, is
largely misunderstood by courts, advocates and academics alike.
Once part of law school curricula in institutions nationwide, resti-
695
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tution has since disappeared and now receives but cursory treat-
ment in general remedies courses.1 As a result, most lawyers and
courts are justifiably confused about its scope and application. 2
This Comment adds to the body of legal literature clarifying
the role and significance of unjust enrichment, an independent
body of law, as liability for and measurement of restitution, with a
focus on Rhode Island jurisprudence. Specifically, an independent
law of unjust enrichment offers three substantial advantages to
any system of civil liability. First, the law of unjust enrichment
provides a cause of action where none may be had in contract or
tort.3 Second, a law of unjust enrichment allows for the recovery of
defendant's gain in excess of plaintiffs loss in certain situations.4
Finally, the law of unjust enrichment potentially allows a plaintiff
to trace and recover property or proceeds via the proprietary rem-
edy of constructive trust.5
To illustrate these advantages of unjust enrichment, this
Comment analyzes the cause of action as currently treated by
Rhode Island courts. Because misunderstanding of unjust enrich-
ment is isolated to no particular jurisdiction, an analysis of Rhode
Island jurisprudence lends significantly to a universal comprehen-
sion of the common pitfalls and advantages of this powerful cause
of action.
As part of the effort to define the parameters of unjust en-
richment and illustrate its significance as an independent body of
law, this Comment argues that "quasi-contract," or "contract im-
plied-in-law," should be stricken from the modern legal vocabu-
1. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW THIRD: RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT xv-xvi (Discussion Draft 2000) [here-
inafter THIRD RESTATEMENT]; see also Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Sig-
nificance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1277 (1989) ("Few law schools
teach a separate course in restitution, no restitution casebook is in print, and
scholarship in the field is largely devoted to specific applications.").
2. See THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at xv-xvi; Andrew Kull, Ra-
tionalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1191 (1995) (commenting that
most lawyers associate the term restitution with criminal law, not a distinct
mode of civil liability based on unjust enrichment); Laycock, supra note 1, at
1277 ("In the mental map of most lawyers, restitution consists largely of
blank spaces with undefined borders and only scattered patches of familiar
ground.").
3. See infra Part II.B.1.
4. See infra Part II.B.2.
5. See infra Part II.B.3. For a definition of constructive trust, see infra
text accompanying note 39.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
lary. Historically, the term quasi-contract was employed to cata-
logue various "common counts," causes of action available in the
English law courts.6 It must be stressed, however, that the actions
comprising quasi-contract were based on unjust enrichment liabil-
ity, not contractual theories.7 Uncertainty as to the semantic dis-
tinctions between quasi-contract, contract implied-in-law and
contract implied-in-fact, coupled with a common law that equates
unjust enrichment with quasi-contract, invites arbitrary labeling
of either cause of action. Moreover, a jurisdiction that views quasi-
contract as legally tantamount to unjust enrichment inhibits the
development of unjust enrichment as an independent body of law.
This Comment begins with a brief exposition of the law of un-
just enrichment as proposed in the discussion draft of the Re-
statement (Third) of the Law of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment (Third Restatement). The next section discusses the
law's scope, followed by a further explication of the advantages of
unjust enrichment. Part III undertakes an analysis of unjust en-
richment in Rhode Island. Part IV concludes that realization of a
coherent, independent law of unjust enrichment requires elimina-
tion of quasi-contract from the legal vocabulary.
II. THE MODERN VIEW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT
A. Overview of an Independent Law of Unjust Enrichment
The current legal environment entertains a variety of mean-
ings and interpretations of the term "restitution." While restitu-
tion is often prescribed to mandate criminal reparations or remedy
liability in contract or tort, neither application sufficiently conveys
the substantive import of modem restitution.8 Instead, "most of
what is covered by the law of restitution might more helpfully be
called the law of unjust or unjustified enrichment."9
6. See Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 SMU
L. REV. 1577, 1600 (2002).
7. See id.
8. See THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, ch.1, § 1, at 12-13.
9. Id. at ch. 1, § 1, 7. The Third Restatement points out that a distinction
must be drawn between the terms "unjust enrichment" and "unjustified en-
richment." The term "unjust enrichment" connotes notions of a priori moral-
ity borne from dictum found in Moses v. Macferlan that "the gist of this kind
of action is, that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged
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The American Law Institute, in an ongoing effort to produce a
Third Restatement, has defined restitution primarily as liability
for and measurement of unjust enrichment. 10 Unjust enrichment
is "[t]he retention of a benefit conferred by another, without offer-
ing compensation, in circumstances where compensation is rea-
sonably expected."" Thus, this Comment focuses on unjust
enrichment as the basis of liability in restitution - a body of law
parallel to contract and tort - in accord with the Third Restate-
ment. 12
In addition to comprising the foundation for the Third Re-
statement, this formulation of restitution finds support in current
legal academia. 13 Indeed the proposed title of the Third Restate-
ment incorporates both restitution and unjust enrichment to un-
by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the money." 97 Eng. Rep.
676, 681 (1760); see also THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, ch.1, § 1, at 1-2.
However attractive in principle, such a broad interpretation of unjust en-
richment necessarily leads to the mistaken conclusion that restitution is
available in all instances of unjust enrichment. This is not the case. Restitu-
tion is available only where there exists "unjustified enrichment" - "enrich-
ment that lacks an adequate legal basis." Id. ch.1, § 1, at 3.
10. See generally THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, ch. 1.
11. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1536 (7th ed. 1999).
12. See THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, ch.1, § 1, at 12-13
('[RIestitution (meaning the law of unjust or unjustified enrichment) is itself
a source of obligations, analogous in this respect to tort or contract."); see also
Kull, supra note 2 at 1192-93; Murphy, supra note 6, at 1582.
13. See Kull, supra note 2, at 1193 ("The modern consensus puts unjust
enrichment at the heart of liability in restitution .... "); see generally THIRD
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, ch. 1, § 1. However, it is important to note that
current academia promulgates at least two alternate formulations of restitu-
tion. At one end of the spectrum, Peter Birks has suggested that restitution is
exclusively remedial in nature. Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful
Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1767, 1767 (2001) (aligning himself as a "multi-
causalist[], [one] who believes that restitution is the law's response to a num-
ber of different causative events"). A position falling between Birks's and the
definition adhered to in this Comment is a theory advanced by Douglas Lay-
cock, suggesting that restitution, in fact, is both a liability-based body of law
and a remedial tool. Laycock, supra note 1, at 1279. Such lack of consensus
surrounding the appropriate formulation of restitution has undoubtedly been
a factor in the misguided application of unjust enrichment. See Kull, supra
note 2, at 1194 ("Disagreement at this basic level about the content of the law
of torts or the law of contracts would be unthinkable. .. because they have
acquired stable conventional definitions (as restitution has yet to do).").
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
derline the interdependence inherent in the relationship of these
terms. 14
B. The Advantages of Unjust Enrichment
Understanding unjust enrichment has paramount signifi-
cance for a complete accounting of civil liability in a given jurisdic-
tion.15 Recognition of unjust enrichment as a substantive body of
law affords a party a cause of action where none may be had in
contract or tort. 16 In addition, the remedy of restitution - meas-
ured by defendant's gain rather than plaintiffs loss - may be a
more attractive remedy than damages in tort.17 Finally, unjust en-
richment allows a plaintiff to trace and recover property or pro-
ceeds that have either been transformed or lie with a third party.'8
1. When Unjust Enrichment is an Exclusive Means of Recovery
Unjust enrichment is most easily comprehended when it is
the only mode of recovery available to a plaintiff. According to the
Third Restatement, the law of unjust enrichment comprises the
sole basis for liability in "transfers subject to avoidance," 19 such as
the mistaken payment of money not due, mistaken improvements
to property, a benefit conferred under fraud or duress, or a trans-
fer under legal compulsion.20 It is within this first category that
14. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, ch.1, § 1, at 7. Please note that
this Comment will refer to "restitution as liability for and measurement of
unjust enrichment" simply as "unjust enrichment" to avoid any confusion be-
tween the terms stemming from their unique association with one another.
15. See Kull, supra note 2, at 1192.
16. See id. at 1192-93.
17. See THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, ch.1, § 1, at 8; Kull, supra note
2, at 1192-93.
18. See THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, ch.1, § 56.
19. This is the title given to the first substantive chapter of the Third Re-
statement. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, ch.2 Table of Contents.
20. See id. Under the second chapter of the discussion draft entitled
"Transfers Subject to Avoidance," the Third Restatement lists three subtopics
comprising all instances where unjust enrichment may be the sole cause of
action available to a plaintiff. Id. The first subtopic, "Transfers Induced by
Mistake," includes "Invalidating Mistake," "Payment of Money Not Due,"
"Performance or Discharge of Another's Obligation," "Payment in Discharge
of Lien," "Benefits Other Than Money," "Mistaken Improvements," "Mistake
in Gifts Inter Vivos" and "Mistake in Impression." Id. The second subtopic,
"Other Instances of Defective Consent," lists "Fraud and Misrepresentation:
Rescission," "Duress," "Undue Influence" and "Incapacity of Transferor" as
2004] 699
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unjust enrichment affords a plaintiff a cause of action where none
may be had in either contract or tort.21 Where a nonconsensual
transfer is "void or voidable at the election of the transferor...
because it has been induced by mistake, fraud, duress, or other
invalidating cause," unjust enrichment will be the sole basis for
recovery. 22
Andrew Kull, the Reporter for the Third Restatement, has la-
beled the mistaken payment of money as the prima facie case of
unjust enrichment. 23 The Third Restatement gives the following as
an example of this situation:
A owes B $100 on an account. By mistake, A pays B $200.
There is no contract between A and B establishing a duty
to refund a payment not due. B's obligation to refund the
overpayment is a liability in restitution. 24
As this example makes clear, A has no recourse in either con-
tract or tort to recover the excess $100 paid to B. B's liability is de-
fined and measured by the amount he was unjustly enriched at
the expense of A; thus B is liable to A in restitution for $100.
2. Availability of Defendant's Gain When it Exceeds Plaintiffs
Loss
The second significant advantage of unjust enrichment is the
potential requirement that a defendant disgorge any gain that
may exceed a plaintiffs loss. In other words, when a plaintiff may
maintain concurrent actions in tort and unjust enrichment, recov-
ery for unjust enrichment might exceed recovery in tort.25
contents. Id. The final subtopic, "Transfers Under Legal Compulsion," in-
cludes "Judgment Subsequently Reversed or Avoided" and "Recovery of Tax
Payments." Id.
21. See Kull, supra note 2, at 1192 ("[T]here are important instances of
liability that contract and tort, conventionally defined, cannot adequately ex-
plain. In some cases, a theory of unjust enrichment provides the only avail-
able explanation of why the defendant is liable at all.").
22. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, ch.1, § 1, at 8; see also id. ch.2.
23. Kull, supra note 2, at 1228.
24. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, ch.1, § 1, at 9.
25. See id. ch.1, § 3, at 24 ("As a practical matter, therefore, the claim in
restitution will have independent significance chiefly in those cases where
the benefit to the defendant from defendant's wrongdoing exceeds the injury
to the plaintiff .. ").
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Notably absent from this discussion is the analogous situation
in contract law, when a plaintiff has concurrent claims in both
contract and unjust enrichment. There is a simple reason for this
omission. Voluntary transfers - those based on enforceable prom-
ises, either express or implied-in-fact - have, by definition, con-
templated value. Therefore, even in the presence of conscious
wrongdoing (i.e., efficient breach) the proper measure of recovery
necessarily refers back to the initial agreement because a transac-
tional value has previously been set.26 Unjust enrichment as jux-
taposed with tort, alternatively, appraises value "by external
social standards,... framed with equal logic in terms either of de-
fendant's gain (restitution) or plaintiffs loss (tort)."27 For these
reasons, when an express or implied-in-fact contract exists be-
tween two parties, contract law will take precedence in determin-
ing the outcome of the case. 28
Because the amount of recovery in unjust enrichment is
measured by defendant's gain as opposed to plaintiffs loss, gener-
ally when a defendant has consciously wronged a plaintiff, any
amount in excess of the benefit taken at plaintiffs expense may be
recovered. Defendant's gain, however, may potentially be less
than, equal to or greater than plaintiffs loss. 29 For instance, con-
sider a thief who steals $100.00 from an unsuspecting victim and
stows the cash away. Recovery in tort is exactly that in unjust en-
richment: namely $100.00. However, should the same thief invest
the $100.00 and realize a profit from the investment, recovery in
unjust enrichment would exceed recovery in tort.30 When defen-
26. See Kull, supra note 2, at 1209 n.54 ("The attempt to identify unjust
enrichment in a contractual context inevitably dissolves into contract inter-
pretation. . . because we have no standard by which to measure either justice
or injustice in a contractual exchange apart from the parties' agreement, ac-
tual or imputed.").
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1209; accord THiRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, ch.1, § 2, at 21
("Contract is incomparably superior to restitution as a means of regulating
most voluntary transfers because it eliminates, or minimizes, the fundamen-
tal difficulty of valuation. Considerations of justice as well as efficiency re-
quire, therefore, that voluntary transfers be made pursuant to contract
whenever reasonably possible.").
29. See Murphy, supra note 6, at 1589 & n.66.
30. When a defendant has realized additional gains directly flowing from
money or property taken from a plaintiff with knowledge of her wrongdoing,
the plaintiff is often entitled to disgorgement of those additional gains.
2004]
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dant's gain is less than or equal to plaintiffs loss, pursuing a
cause of action in unjust enrichment will be undesirable since,
generally speaking, plaintiffs loss can be recovered under tradi-
tional tort or contract law.31
When defendant's gain exceeds plaintiffs loss, a cause of ac-
tion in unjust enrichment will be most attractive to a plaintiff. For
example, a defendant may have used the initial benefit obtained
at the plaintiffs expense to realize additional assets. This surplus
is often referred to as profits, which a defendant is required to dis-
gorge upon a showing of conscious wrongdoing.32 It is only in un-
just enrichment that a plaintiff may recover these defendant
gains; a cause of action in tort is remedied exclusively by recovery
of the plaintiffs loss. 33
The rationale underlying a defendant's duty to disgorge all
realized gain when he has acted as a conscious wrongdoer is two-
fold: deterrence and liability. The Third Restatement recognizes
the potential for a defendant to discount unjust enrichment claims
as mere costs of doing business if recovery in unjust enrichment
were limited to plaintiffs loss. 34 To deter such behavior and to
highlight the import of the underlying tort claim, a conscious
wrongdoer must disgorge anything in excess of the initial benefit
to exact a proportionate sanction. Because disgorgement is such a
31. Obviously, this formulation of defendant's gain is redundant. See
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, ch.1, § 1, at 10. The Third Restatement
explicitly recognizes that where defendant's gain equals plaintiff's loss and
can be recovered under either unjust enrichment or tort or contract, the de-
fendant has "duplicative liability." Id. As such, the Third Restatement omits
any mention of such "duplicative liability" since its genesis has an alternate
source outside of unjust enrichment. Id.
32. Id. ch.1, § 3, at 24; see, e.g., id. at 23-25 (referring to realized "profits"
to describe defendant's gain in excess of the original benefit). While a defen-
dant's excessive gain is commonly referred to as "profit," this Comment will
instead exclusively refer to any surplus as "defendant's gain" to avoid any
confusion with alternate definitions of the word "profit."
33. See id. It is essential to note that while defendant is simultaneously
liable in tort and unjust enrichment, his gains in excess of the initial benefit
are only recoverable in an action for unjust enrichment. Id. This distinction is
the essence of this second advantage of unjust enrichment.
34. See id. Unjust enrichment "requires full disgorgement of profits by a
conscious wrongdoer, because any lesser liability would provide an inade-
quate incentive to contract." Id. ch. 1, § 3, at 25. In other words, if a defendant
was only liable for plaintiffs loss in such situations, there would be no moti-
vation for the defendant to enter a legally cognizable agreement for the same
benefit with the plaintiff. See id.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
drastic remedy, however, conscious wrongdoing is a prerequisite
to recovery of defendant's gain in excess of plaintiffs loss.
35
Disgorgement can also be explained in terms of liability; while
tort law measures liability by the extent of nonconsensual harm
inflicted upon a plaintiff, unjust enrichment measures liability by
the extent of benefit conferred upon a defendant (defendant's gain)
at a plaintiffs expense. 36 As Kull aptly notes, "Whenever the law
gives a remedy measured by the defendant's gain rather than the
plaintiffs loss, a duty to disgorge unjust enrichment will explain
the defendant's liability more readily... than will a duty merely
to refrain from injuring others."37
The availability of disgorgement of defendant's gain is impor-
tant for two reasons. First, a jurisdiction that prefers tort to un-
just enrichment due to unfamiliarity may be prone to summarily
dismiss unjust enrichment claims where the evidence clearly
demonstrates a tort has been committed. In such a case, if the de-
fendant is a conscious wrongdoer, dismissal would potentially pre-
clude a plaintiffs full recovery of the defendant's gain. Similarly,
the advocate who does not fully comprehend the scope of recovery
available in unjust enrichment may view the two causes of action
as substantively identical, potentially denying her client a more
attractive remedy. A simple hypothetical is illustrative. Suppose
Adam has purchased a winning lottery ticket for $1. Eve, without
Adam's consent and before the drawing, takes the ticket and, after
the drawing, claims a $5,000 award. Adam suffers no physical
harm from Eve's act. Eve is liable in tort to Adam for $1; however,
Eve is simultaneously liable in unjust enrichment to Adam for
$5,000. Since Eve's gain was the result of conscious wrongdoing -
the nonconsensual transfer of Adam's lottery ticket - Eve must
disgorge her winnings. Otherwise, Eve's retention of $4,999.00, af-
ter Adam's recovery in tort, would constitute unjust enrichment at
Adam's expense.
3. Tracing Property and Proceeds
A third advantage of unjust enrichment allows a plaintiff to
trace and recover her property or proceeds wrongfully obtained by
35. See id. ch.1, § 3, at 25.
36. Id. ch.1, § 2, at 15.
37. Kull, supra note 2, at 1193.
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a defendant that have either changed form (e.g., embezzled mon-
ies used to purchase property) or lie with a third party (e.g., em-
bezzler gives proceeds to another).38 Constructive trust is "[a] trust
imposed by a court on equitable grounds against one who has ob-
tained property by wrongdoing, thereby preventing the wrongful
holder from being unjustly enriched."39 This proprietary remedy is
generally invoked in these instances, offering a return of property
or a refund of money rather than a damage award.40
The ability for a plaintiff to trace property or proceeds wrong-
fully obtained by a defendant is significant to a law of unjust en-
richment in two situations. The first, referred to as a "simple two-
party contest" by the Third Restatement, occurs when a "claimant
has traced misappropriated property into its product, held by [a
single] defendant, and the remedy is a declaration that the defen-
dant holds the new property in constructive trust."41 The estab-
lished constructive trust allows the plaintiff to obtain the new
property held by the defendant.42 Consider the following example
from the Third Restatement:
B embezzles $50,000 from A and invests the money. A
traces the stolen funds into shares now worth $200,000.
In a two-party contest between A and B, A is entitled to a
declaration that B holds the shares in constructive trust
for A. 43
38. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, ch.1, § 4, at 28-31.
39. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1515 (7th ed. 1999); see also THIRD
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, ch.1, § 4 at 28.
40. See id. ch.1, § 4, at 29 (explaining "why and when restitution allows a
proprietary remedy as opposed to a simple money claim"). The Third Re-
statement suggests that the proprietary remedy of constructive trust affords
more complete and efficient recovery because the court avoids the necessary
task of valuation inherent in awarding a pecuniary equivalent. Id. This is not
to say, however, that a court is without the power to issue a money judgment
as an alternative. See id. ("The court could give a money judgment for the
value of the new property ....
41. Id.
42. Id. The property is labeled new because in.many instances the prop-
erty wrongfully taken from the plaintiff will not be in the identical form when
the constructive trust is established as it was when it was obtained by the de-
fendant.
43. Id. ch.1, § 4, at 30. Note here that disgorgement of the $150,000 real-
ized from the investment is available to prevent the defendant's unjust en-
richment at the plaintiffs expense. Compare this situation to that of the
"multi-party contest" discussed below where disgorgement is unavailable
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Thus, the court awards the plaintiff the shares.
A second situation where constructive trust significantly af-
fects unjust enrichment is in a "multi-party contest" where the
"claimant [is competing] with other creditors and potential credi-
tors of the initial transferee."44 In this situation, the primary goal
of unjust enrichment is to create a preference for the plaintiff
above the transferee's creditors when those creditors would be un-
justly enriched by the retention of any property or proceeds
wrongfully obtained from the plaintiff.45 Consider the following
example from the Third Restatement:
A is induced by fraud to convey Blackacre to B. B de-
clares bankruptcy, and B's bankruptcy trustee claims
Blackacre as part of the bankruptcy estate.... [The] two-
party contest has been supplanted by a new restitution
contest, between A on the one hand and B's general credi-
tors on the other. "Strong-arm clause" permitting, A re-
covers Blackacre by means of a declaration that B holds
the property in constructive trust for A. The remedy is
granted because the alternative would be a nonconsen-
sual transfer from A to the general creditors, resulting in
the unjust enrichment of the creditors at A's expense.4 6
As the above example illustrates, unjust enrichment provides a
plaintiff with the means of reclaiming her property held by defen-
dant.
when the plaintiff attempts to recover from a defendant's creditors. See infra
notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
44. Id. ch.1, § 4, at 29.
45. Id.
46. Id. ch. 1, § 4, at 30. As this example illustrates, when a claim for un-
just enrichment is made and the remedy is in constructive trust but involves
the defendant's creditors, disgorgement is generally unavailable if the credi-
tors are the rightful parties in interest to the defendant's debt. The Third Re-
statement explains that the purpose of constructive trust in this context
becomes merely to avoid the unjust enrichment of the creditors at the plain-
tiffs expense. Id. at 31. When a claim for restitution involving a defendant's
creditors becomes "attenuated and artificial," mere restoration (plus interest)
of the initially misappropriated proceeds or property is the appropriate rem-
edy. Id.
2004]
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III. UNJUST ENRICHMENT IN RHODE ISLAND
This Comment will next apply the above principles and ad-
vantages of unjust enrichment to ascertain Rhode Island's treat-
ment of the cause of action. A brief explication of the current
parameters of Rhode Island's law of unjust enrichment is immedi-
ately followed by a discussion of the state's treatment of an unjust
enrichment claim when no other cause of action is available (i.e.,
in contract or tort). This first section is followed by an analysis of
the Rhode Island unjust enrichment claim when a plaintiff has
concurrently viable actions in both tort and unjust enrichment. A
third section examines the relationship between unjust enrich-
ment and contract law in Rhode Island. This discussion analyzes
unjust enrichment claims in the presence of legally valid, contem-
plated agreements. A fourth section summarizes the Rhode Island
courts' implementation of the proprietary remedy of constructive
trust.
A. General Principles
Rhode Island does recognize a cause of action for unjust en-
richment 47 as an alternative pleading to contract 48 and tort
claims. 49 A Rhode Island court may even occasionally invoke un-
47. See Metro Properties, Inc. v. Yatsko, 763 A.2d 617, 621 (R.I. 2000)
(recognizing a claim for unjust enrichment but concluding that the cause of
action cannot be used to circumvent a statutory requirement); Richmond
Square Capital Corp. v. Ins. House, 744 A.2d 401, 402 (R.I. 1999) (holding
that plaintiff's recovery of unearned insurance premiums was appropriate
under a claim for unjust enrichment); Lehman v. Robitaille, 714 A.2d 605,
606-07 (R.I. 1998) (holding that a subcontractor could not recover from a
homeowner under a claim for unjust enrichment for services rendered);
Providence Steel & Iron Co., v. Flammand, 413 A.2d 487, 487-88 (R.I. 1980)
(holding that a steel supplier could recover from a property owner the value
of goods supplied under a claim for unjust enrichment when the general con-
tractor had declared bankruptcy); Cardoso v. Mendes, 1998 WL 321439, *13-
15 (R.I. Super. Ct. June 9, 1998) (invoking the doctrine of unjust enrichment
to allow defendants to recover the value of a mortgage less principal pay-
ments already made by the plaintiffs).
48. See, e.g., Yatsko, 763 A.2d at 619.
49. See, e.g., Richmond Square, 744 A.2d at 401 (pleading in unjust en-
richment and conversion); Toupin v. Laverdiere, 729 A.2d 1286, 1287 (R.I.
1999) (pleading "unjust enrichment, conversion, unilateral mistake, and
wrongful payment"); Hauser v. Davis, 2000 WL 1910031, *1 (R.I. Super. Ct.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
just enrichment to allow recovery in the absence of a formal plead-
ing.50 To prove a claim of unjust enrichment in Rhode Island,
a plaintiff is required to prove three elements: (1) a bene-
fit must be conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff,
(2) there must be an appreciation by the defendant of
such benefit, and (3) there must be an acceptance of such
benefit in such circumstances that it would be inequitable
for a defendant to retain the benefit without paying the
value thereof.51
Rhode Island recognizes this cause of action both when a plaintiff
has a claim in tort52 and when a plaintiff has no legally cognizable
action in either contract or tort.5 3
Rhode Island defines "benefit" quite broadly, recognizing the
traditional formulations of the term - such as services rendered,
materials supplied, and money paid - in addition to entertaining
more progressive interpretations. At least one court has recog-
Dec. 21, 2000) (alleging claims of various property right infringements, tres-
pass, tortious interference and unjust enrichment).
50. See, e.g., Cardoso, 1998 WL 321439 at *13-15 (resolving a case under
a claim of unjust enrichment although not pleaded as a counterclaim by de-
fendants because relief was justified exclusively in unjust enrichment); but
see Romano v. Retirement Bd. of the Employee's Retirement System of R.I.,
767 A.2d 35, 44-46 (R.I. 2000) (holding that a sua sponte order of restitution
by a trial judge was inappropriate when this relief was not prayed for by
defendant).
51. Id. at 673 (quoting Anthony Corrado, Inc. v. Menard & Co. Building
Contractors, 589 A.2d 1201, 1201-02 (R.I. 1991)).
52. See, e.g., Richmond Square, 744 A.2d at 401-02 (affirming jury
awards for both conversion and unjust enrichment). The holding of this case
is examined in greater detail below. See infra Part III.C.
53. See, e.g., Toupin, 729 A.2d at 1288-89 (allowing recovery for a mis-
taken payment). It is important to note that Rhode Island will not always al-
low recovery in unjust enrichment when a plaintiff has conferred money upon
a defendant under a mistake of fact. If the defendant has changed her cir-
cumstances in such a way that restitution would be "unjust and inequitable
the loss must be borne by the party making the mistake." Romano, 767 A.2d
at 45 (quoting Jonklaas v. Silverman, 370 A.2d 1277, 1282 (R.I. 1977)). A
change in circumstance precluding restitution may be an assumption of li-
abilities or obligations, or payment of the money to a third party creditor. Id.
at 45 (quoting Jonklaas, 370 A.2d at 1282). An example of a changed circum-
stance that will not defeat a prayer for restitution is if the defendant has
used the funds to "cover living expenses or to pay preexisting debts." Id. at 45
(quoting Jonklaas, 370 A.2d at 1282). Andrew Kull has recognized this af-
firmative defense to a claim of unjust enrichment as "uncontroversial." Kull,
supra note 2, at 1232.
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nized the possibility that avoided costs constitute a benefit suffi-
cient for recovery in unjust enrichment.54 Further, in accord with
contemporary mores, a benefit in the form of domestic services
may form a sufficient basis for recovery in unjust enrichment. 55
However, where speculative profits are claimed as the basis for
unjust enrichment (i.e., a benefit defendant may, at his option, ob-
tain in the future at plaintiffs expense), Rhode Island courts ap-
pear unwilling to grant relief.56 In addition, when a plaintiff has
knowledge of the inherent risk involved in a transaction (e.g.,
plaintiff improves her property pursuant to an agreement prem-
ised on the occurrence of a future condition), she will most likely
be precluded from recovery in unjust enrichment;57 thus, Rhode
Island courts seem to appropriately disfavor affording relief to an
officious intermeddler.58
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has designated the appro-
priate measure of relief for unjust enrichment when services are
rendered or materials are provided as the fair and reasonable
54. State v. Lead Industries Ass'n, 2001 WL 345830, *14-15 (R.I. Super.
Ct. Apr. 2, 2001) (refusing to summarily dismiss a claim for unjust enrich-
ment where the benefit conferred was allowing defendants to avoid the costs
incident to their business by paying for cleanup and medical expenses related
to lead contamination).
55. See Doe v. Burkland, 808 A.2d 1090, 1095 (R.I. 2002). Here, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed a lower court's grant of summaryjudgment on claims of breach of implied-in-fact contract and unjust enrich-
ment. Id. The Court held that domestic services would suffice as considera-
tion for an implied-in-fact contract, but if such a contract could not be
factually implied, the plaintiff could potentially recover the reasonable value
of those services in unjust enrichment. Id.
56. See Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670 (R.I. 1997). In this case, plain-
tiffs, survivors of the deceased, brought an action for unjust enrichment,
among others, to recover any profits the defendant - convicted of murdering a
woman and her two daughters - might realize by selling the rights to his
story of the slayings. Id. The court held that the plaintiffs could not recover in
unjust enrichment because these speculative profits (a) did not constitute a
benefit under Rhode Island law, and (b) even conceding they were a legally
cognizable benefit the plaintiffs had not conferred the benefit upon the defen-
dant. Id. at 672-73.
57. See Eastern Motor Inns, Inc. v. Ricci, 565 A.2d 1265, 1272-73 (R.I.
1989) (holding that where plaintiff had made improvements to property with
knowledge that its only legal claim to the land was under a purchase and
sales agreement whose enforceability was conditioned upon a zoning vari-
ance, no recovery in unjust enrichment could be had).
58. This is consistent with the practice of denying relief to the officious
intermeddler. See THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, ch. 1, § 2, at 21-22.
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value of the services or materials.5 9 Similarly, a plaintiff who has
made a payment under a mistake of fact may be able to recover
the amount of the mistaken payment, provided the defendant has
not sufficiently changed his circumstances by relying on the
money.60 At least one court, however, has exhibited reluctance to
recognize the availability of defendant's gain when it exceeds
plaintiffs loss, even when the defendant was a conscious wrong-
doer.61 Thus, a plaintiff in Rhode Island may be denied the right to
disgorgement of profits in such cases where a defendant has en-
gaged in conscious wrongdoing and realized a profit from this tor-
tious conduct. The implications of this are discussed below.6 2
B. Unjust Enrichment as a Sole Cause of Action in Rhode Island
According to Andrew Kull, the prima facie case of unjust en-
richment exists when a plaintiff makes a payment to a defendant
under a mistake of fact.63 In such a scenario, there has been no
promise between the parties to warrant recovery under breach of
contract, and there has been no tort committed, thereby preclud-
ing recovery under either mode of liability.6 4 Thus, the plaintiffs
only avenue of recovery is in unjust enrichment. 65 Of course, mis-
taken payment does not exhaust the list of circumstances in which
a plaintiff may have no other means of recovery than in unjust en-
richment; indeed a plaintiff may plead unjust enrichment alterna-
tively to either contract or tort and have either of these latter
claims summarily dismissed or barred by an applicable statute of
limitations, leaving only the unjust enrichment claim as the sole
viable cause of action and means of recovery. What follows is an
exposition of Rhode Island jurisprudence where unjust enrichment
is a plaintiffs only means of civil recourse.
59. See, e.g., ADP Marshall, Inc. v. Brown Univ., 784 A.2d 309, 312-13
(R.I. 2001).
60. See infra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., Hauser v. Davis, 2000 WL 1910031, *4 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec.
21, 2000) (holding that because defendant took benefit from plaintiff, it was
not conferred upon him and thus recovery was in tort, which was barred by
the statute of limitations, not unjust enrichment).
62. See infra Part III.B.
63. Kull, supra note 2, at 1228.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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In 1999, the Rhode Island Supreme Court specifically dealt
with an action for unjust enrichment involving a mistaken pay-
ment.66 Mary and Robert had filed for divorce. A court order pre-
vented the transfer of either parties' assets while the divorce was
pending.67 During this period, however, Robert sold his liquor
business and acted as mortgagor for the third party buyer on a
$41,000 mortgage.68 Still during the divorce proceedings, the third
party satisfied his debt by paying Robert the full value of the note
with financing obtained through plaintiff Toupin, an agent of a
major mortgage corporation. 69 The $41,000 was paid to Robert by
Toupin, and Robert deposited the money into his checking ac-
count.70 Upon learning of the transfer, Mary contacted Toupin to
inquire about the payment made to Robert.71 Toupin mistakenly
responded that the $41,000 remained uncashed7 2 In the course of
subsequent litigation to estop Robert from cashing the check,
Mary's attorney filed an ex parte motion asking the court to pre-
vent Robert from cashing the check7 3 The court granted the order,
but Mary's attorney had added that Toupin was to cut a second
check for $41,000 made payable to the Family Court until resolu-
tion of the divorce 4 Upon finalizing the divorce, the Family Court
awarded the liquor store proceeds to Mary, and, after she with-
drew the sum, Toupin was surprised to discover that his escrow
account was short $41,000.75
Toupin was faced with a situation where he had mistakenly
conferred a benefit upon others in the absence of contractual priv-
ity or tortious harm at his own expense. There was no liability in
contract law because Robert never made an express promise to
pay back any mistakenly received funds, and the facts as given did
not demonstrate that Robert acted in a manner implying an
66. Toupin v. Laverdiere, 729 A.2d 1286 (R.I. 1999).
67. Id. at 1286.
68. Id. at 1287.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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agreement to do so. 76 Likewise, tort law offered no basis for liabil-
ity because Robert did not steal the funds, nor did he accept them
with knowledge that he should not.7 7 Thus, the only viable mode of
recovery for Toupin was unjust enrichment. The Rhode Island Su-
preme Court, attributing fault for the mistaken payment to Mary,
Mary's lawyer and Robert, affirmed the trial court's ruling that
Mary and Robert were jointly and severally liable to Toupin for
the mistaken payment.78
Perhaps the most salient feature of Rhode Island cases con-
cerning mistaken payment is the stringent application of the
"changed position" affirmative defense. As noted above, Rhode Is-
land will allow recovery in unjust enrichment for a mistaken pay-
ment only if a defendant has not materially altered his position in
reliance on the money paid.79 The seminal case illustrating the op-
eration of this affirmative defense is Jonklaas v. Silverman,80 in
which a stockbroker sued a client to recover mistakenly paid mar-
ket earnings. The Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated a judg-
ment for the plaintiff and remanded the case, finding that "the
defendant was entitled to introduce evidence showing a change in
circumstances as a result of the mistake" and concluding that "the
action of the trial justice in excluding such evidence as irrelevant
was a misconception of law and clearly error."81
Likewise, in Romano v. Retirement Board of the Employee's
Retirement System of Rhode Island, 2 the court reversed a trial
76. This distinction between an express agreement and one implied from
the facts of Robert and Toupin's relationship is simply to stress that in either
case, Robert's liability would exclusively lie in contract.
77. The only conceivable action in tort here may be found in conversion.
However, a successful conversion claim would require that Mary have knowl-
edge that Robert cashed the first payment by Toupin, a fact that is immedi-
ately controverted by Toupin's representation that the check had not been
cashed.
78. Toupin, 729 A.2d at 1289. It is worth noting that the court rejected
defendants' argument that Toupin was barred from recovery because the mis-
taken payment was the result of his own lack of care: "This contention runs
afoul of the prevailing view that '[a] person who has conferred a benefit upon
another by mistake is not precluded from maintaining an action for restitu-
tion by the fact that the mistake was due to his own lack of care.'" Id. at
1288-89 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, RESTITUTION § 59 (1937)).
79. See supra note 53.
80. 370 A.2d 1277 (R.I. 1977).
81. Id. at 1282.
82. 767 A.2d 35 (R.I. 2001).
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court's sua sponte order of restitution for unemployment benefits
mistakenly paid to defendant Romano. Romano retired from the
Rhode Island Department of Transportation (RIDOT) and subse-
quently accepted municipal employment from the town of Bris-
tol.83 A municipal director had misinformed Romano, leading him
to believe that he could legally collect retirement benefits from
RIDOT in addition to his municipal salary.8 4 For nearly seven
years, Rhode Island paid the defendant in this manner and
Romano accepted such payment in violation of a Rhode Island
statute; the State subsequently sought recovery of the mistaken
payments in restitution.8 5 The supreme court held that a factual
inquiry into whether the defendant changed his circumstances as
a result of the payments must precede any sua sponte order of res-
titution.8 6
Note that the mere presence of plaintiff negligence will not
preclude that plaintiffs recovery in unjust enrichment.81 For ex-
ample, in Jonklaas, the plaintiff stock broker was permitted to re-
cover in unjust enrichment despite arguable negligence in failing
to update his database to reflect the defendant's transferred
shares.88 Similarly, the plaintiff retirement board in Romano,
while perhaps negligent in its oversight of defendant's double-
dipping, was allowed to argue its entitlement to reimbursement
83. Id. at 36-37.
84. Id. at 36.
85. Id. at 37-38.
86. Id. at 44-46; accord R.I. Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Almonte, 1981 WL
386426, *1-2 (R.I. Super. Ct. June 4, 1981) (stating that mistaken payment
may be recovered in unjust enrichment "provided the payment has not
caused such a change in the position of the payee that it would be unjust to
require a refund").
87. The court in Jonklaas explicitly noted, "The trial justice found that
there was a mutual mistake of a material fact and that even though defen-
dant had knowledge of the error he did nothing about it." Jonklass v.
Silverman, 370 A.2d 1277, 1281 (R.I. 1977). Indeed, the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court has noted that "a party who has conferred a benefit upon an-
other by mistake is not precluded from maintaining an action for restitution
because the mistake was caused by that party's own lack of care." Romano,
767 A.2d at 44 (citing Toupin v. Laverdiere, 729 A.2d 1286, 1289 (R.I. 1999));
see also Almonte, 1981 WL 386426 at *1-2 (recognizing negligence by bank in
failing to verify a check endorsement resulting in mistaken payment on the
check, but concluding that the bank could still recover under unjust enrich-
ment).
88. See Jonklass, 370 A.2d at 1281.
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via unjust enrichment.8 9 Because too often mistake will border on
negligence - certainly at some point mistake must be precipitated
by an oversight - a requirement that there be an absence of negli-
gence by a plaintiff would preclude recovery in most cases, even
those where retention of a benefit obtained at plaintiffs expense
would be unjust.
Despite being the prima facie case for unjust enrichment, mis-
taken payment is not the only situation where the cause of action
will be an exclusive remedy. Alternately, a plaintiff may sue for
breach of an express or implied-in-fact contract and the court may
dismiss the claim for lack of consideration. The Rhode Island Su-
preme Court entertained such a case in Doe v. Burkland.90 Doe
had resided with his partner for nine years, during which time he
performed regular domestic services. 91 The two men separated
under adverse circumstances and Doe sought injunctive relief to
stop Burkland's threats and harassment.92 Burkland counter-
claimed for breach of an express or implied-in-fact contract and
unjust enrichment, alleging that the two had an oral agreement to
share all property individually acquired during their relation-
ship.93 The trial court ruled that any agreement between the two
men was unenforceable because Rhode Island "does not recognize
'a marital dissolution between unmarried couples, homosexual or
heterosexual."' 94 The supreme court reversed the trial court's
summary dismissal of Burkland's counterclaims, holding that his
agreement to "'devote his skills, effort, labors and earnings' to as-
sist plaintiff in his career, and that he provided homemaking ser-
vices, business consulting, and counseling to plaintiff," was
sufficient consideration to allow enforcement of either an express
or implied-in-fact contract. 95 The court proceeded to indicate that
even if the lower court were to find no enforceable contract, Burk-
land may still have a cause of action in unjust enrichment if "[Doe]
acquired certain property with the help of the legitimate services
89. See Romano, 767 A.2d at 44.
90. 808 A.2d 1090 (R.I. 2002).
91. Id. at 1092.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1092-93. The defendant also included claims for promissory es-
toppel, constructive trust and resulting trust. Id.
94. Id. at 1093.
95. Id. at 1094.
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that [defendant] provided to him."96 On remand, the trial court
might not find an express or implied-in-fact contract ever existed
between the two men, in which case Burkland's only recourse
would be in unjust enrichment.
Unjust enrichment may also provide an exclusive remedy
when a concurrent tort claim is barred by an applicable statute of
limitations. In Hauser v. Davis, 97 the town of Warwick entered
Hauser's land and rerouted a stream without permission.98 The
city failed to remedy the resulting swamp area, and Hauser sued
the town for various property rights infractions,99 tortious inter-
ference and unjust enrichment.100 The relevant holding of the
court was that the claim for tortious interference was barred by a
statute of limitations. 101 The court held that the unjust enrich-
ment claim did not survive summary judgment, concluding that
"[the town's] conduct [was] plainly tortious not inequitable," 10 2 be-
cause Hauser did not confer a benefit upon the town at his own
expense, but rather the town took the benefit from plaintiff,
The holding is flawed in two respects. 0 3 First, it assumes that
a claim for unjust enrichment cannot exist when a set of circum-
stances may also give rise to tort liability. This proposition clearly
contradicts the Third Restatement which specifically provides that
it is precisely in this situation of concurrent liability that unjust
enrichment has "particular significance."10 4
96. Id. at 1095.
97. 2000 WL 1910031 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 21, 2000).
98. Id. at *1.
99. Namely, plaintiff sued the town for eminent domain, denial of proce-
dural due process, denial of substantive due process and inverse condemna-
tion. Id.
100. Id. Plaintiff also sought implied contractual indemnification. Id.
101. The only claim left intact after the court's statute of limitations
analysis was the claim for eminent domain. Id. at *3.
102. Id.
103. The court's distinction between tortious conduct and a benefit here is
questionable. Certainly a plaintiff may maintain a cause of action in unjust
enrichment when a benefit has been taken from her as opposed to being con-
ferred; the distinction is not legally cognizable. See THIRD RESTATEMENT, Su-
pra note 1, ch.1, § 3, at 25 (giving, as an example of an unjust enrichment fact
pattern, an illustration where one may recover in unjust enrichment when a
defendant steals a car and realizes a profit).
104. Id. ch.1, § 3, at 24. The Third Restatement notes that it is when a de-
fendant may be liable in both tort and unjust enrichment that the benefits of
unjust enrichment become obvious. See id. Given this circumstance, recovery
in unjust enrichment may exceed recovery in tort due to the availability of
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Second, this holding would seem to preclude recovery of de-
fendant's gain in excess of plaintiffs loss in instances of conscious
wrongdoing 0 5 Since, in effect, the court is denying Hauser recov-
ery in unjust enrichment simply because the town could have been
liable in tort had the case been timely commenced, Hauser is de-
nied recovery of defendant's gain. In addition, this holding under-
mines both the deterrence and liability rationales underlying the
availability of disgorgement of defendant's gain when the defen-
dant is a conscious wrongdoer 06 Concededly, if the town was not
a conscious wrongdoer, the distinction is purely semantic since
Hauser's recovery would be identical in tort as in unjust enrich-
ment. The distinction becomes critical, however, if Hauser can
show scienter by the town, thereby securing his ability to recover
any gain the town may have realized in excess of his loss. 10 7
This case suggests there may be tension between the law of
torts and unjust enrichment in Rhode Island. When a plaintiff has
concurrently viable claims in both tort and unjust enrichment, at
least the Hauser court seems to be unclear as to the scope and po-
tency, and perhaps even the relevance, of unjust enrichment as a
substantive cause of action. This, in turn, has the effect of foreclos-
ing a plaintiffs opportunity to recover defendant's gain. The fol-
lowing section explores this dilemma in greater detail.
C. Tort and Unjust Enrichment in Rhode Island
Where liability in tort and unjust enrichment overlap, two
principles warrant annunciation. First, that any one set of circum-
stances may give rise to liability in both tort and unjust enrich-
ment, allowing a plaintiff to plead and pursue both causes of
action throughout litigation, but ultimately requiring a plaintiff to
choose recovery in either tort or unjust enrichment. Second, in the
case of conscious wrongdoing, recovery in unjust enrichment may
prove more attractive than tort since the award is quantified by
defendant's gain rather than plaintiffs loss.108 Rhode Island's im-
plementation of these principles is evaluated below.
defendant's gain, thus making unjust enrichment the more attractive rem-
edy. See id.
105. See supra Part II.B.2.
106. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
107. See supra Part II.B.2.
108. See THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, ch.1, § 3, at 24.
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Rhode Island courts recognize that claims for unjust enrich-
ment and tort may be plead together, but the jurisprudence fails
to indicate whether a plaintiff must choose a theory of liability
pre-verdict or a mode of recovery post-verdict. In the landmark
case State v. Lead Industries Ass'n,109 the State sued the defen-
dants ("Lead Industries") alleging multiple causes of action includ-
ing tort and unjust enrichment. 110 The State alleged that it had
incurred substantial costs making renovations, sanitizing various
public and private facilities, and especially paying for its chil-
dren's medical care stemming from Lead Industries' ongoing pro-
duction of lead paint."' On Lead Industries' motion to dismiss, the
court held that the claim for unjust enrichment, and several oth-
ers, survived summary dismissal.112 The court concluded that "[i]t
[was] impossible for [it] to determine at [that] stage that the
State's lead-related expenditures [had] not added to the defen-
dants', including the LIA's, advantage or saved them from loss;"
thus the court was unable to determine, as a matter of law, that
the State had not plead a sufficient claim for unjust enrichment. 113
Although the court allowed claims for tort and unjust enrich-
ment to survive summary judgment and be pursued together in
the same action - thereby at least entertaining the potential for
concurrent liability - note that ultimately, given the same set of
facts, the State can recover under only one theory of liability.
Upon retrial, the State's potential recovery for unjust enrichment
may be more attractive than in tort, and it is precisely at this
intersection of civil liability that unjust enrichment becomes
salient in a coherent and complete system of non-criminal
109. 2001 WL 345830 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 2, 2001). Labeling this litiga-
tion landmark may, in fact, be an understatement. When then Attorney Gen-
eral Sheldon Whitehouse initiated this lawsuit in 1999, "[Rhode Island] [was]
the first [state] in the country to sue the companies for creating a public nui-
sance by making and marketing lead-based paints that continue to poison
children." Peter B. Lord, Judge Postpones Lead-Paint Retrial Until April
2005, Mar. 4, 2004, Al, available at 2004 WL 59116324. Indeed there are
countless articles concerning the litigation since its inception in 1999 on the
Providence Journal website. See generally http://www.projo.com.
110. Lead Industries, 2001 WL 345830 at *1.
111. Id. at *1-2.
112. Id. at *6-16.
113. Id. at *15. This case ultimately ended in a mistrial in 2002. See Lord,
supra note 109. The State has subsequently won the right to relitigate, and
Rhode Island Superior Court Judge Michael A. Silverstein has recently post-
poned this second trial until April 2005. Id.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
in a coherent and complete system of non-criminal accountabil-
ity.114 If Lead Industries is found to have engaged in conscious
wrongdoing, 115 Rhode Island may be presented with a situation
where recovery in tort, measured by the actual costs incurred by
the State to remedy lead-related contamination, is less than the
State's potential recovery in unjust enrichment, measured by Lead
Industries' gain - or the benefit realized as a direct result of being
able to avoid paying for what Rhode Island was forced to incur." 6
This amount may be significantly greater than Rhode Island's
loss.
Another Rhode Island decision illustrating concurrent tort
and unjust enrichment liability is Richmond Square Capital Corp.
v. Insurance House.117 Here, Richmond contracted with a demoli-
tion company to prepare for the possible destruction of certain
property. 118 The demolition company obtained a payment and per-
formance insurance bond from Insurance House, on which Rich-
mond paid the premiums because the demolition company could
not afford to do so. 19 When Richmond ultimately decided not to
have the property destroyed, they attempted to collect the un-
earned premiums from the performance bond, and Insurance
House refused to pay without permission from the demolition
company. 20 Insurance House eventually paid the premiums di-
rectly to the demolition company,' 2' and Richmond brought suit to
recover these funds from the demolition company alleging conver-
114. See supra Part II.B.2.
115. It appears that there is evidence available to support a finding of con-
scious wrongdoing by defendants assuming the second trial reaches the liabil-
ity phase. Two historians have published a book which suggests defendants
were aware of the health risks lead-based paint posed to society, yet contin-
ued its production and distribution. See Peter B. Lord, Historians Say Paint
Makers Knew About Poisonings, Oct. 31, 2002, B1, available at 2002 WI
22527678. The historians' findings were "based on internal company memos,
meeting minutes and reports subpoenaed" for use in another lawsuit. Id. at [
5.
116. See supra Part II.B.2.
117. 744 A.2d 401 (R.I. 1999).
118. Id. at 401. Plaintiffs predecessor, Westminster, actually initiated this
action. Id. Richmond Square was substituted as Westminster's successor cor-
poration before trial commenced. Id. These facts, however, are irrelevant to
the analysis for the purposes of this Comment.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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sion and unjust enrichment. 122 The jury found for Richmond on
both claims, and awarded $22,919.00 in restitution, the amount of
the unearned premiums, and an additional $6,000.00 for conver-
sion.123 The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed this award on
defendant's subsequent appeal.' 24
While pursuing concurrent actions in tort and unjust enrich-
ment pose no particular problem, concurrent recovery - itemizing
an award in terms of both tort and unjust enrichment - blurs the
boundaries of civil liability. It is unclear from the court's opinion
whether these awards arose from the same conduct of the defen-
dant - in which case the court would have impermissibly allowed
recovery both in tort and unjust enrichment - or whether the
award for the conversion claim was attributable to different cir-
cumstances than the award for unjust enrichment. It would be
helpful for the court to have delineated clearly the factual circum-
stances supporting the unjust enrichment award and the different
set of facts underlying the conversion claim. What is absolutely
crucial is that a plaintiff not recover in both unjust enrichment
and tort for the same conduct.
D. Contract and Unjust Enrichment in Rhode Island
Where liability in contract and unjust enrichment intersect,
two issues merit consideration. Recall that when a single set of
circumstances may give rise to liability in both contract and un-
just enrichment, contract law is better equipped to offer an appro-
priate remedy.125 However, exceptions to this general premise
exist. First, when a benefit is conferred that is beyond the scope of
a valid agreement, a plaintiff may recover this value in unjust en-
richment. Second, if an otherwise valid contract is void or voidable
(e.g., an agreement induced by fraud or misrepresentation) then a
plaintiffs sole mode of recovery may be in unjust enrichment. The
workings of these doctrines in Rhode Island are examined below.
122. Id. Plaintiffs initially sought to recover the unearned premiums only
from Insurance House under breach of contract or conversion, but then
amended their complaint to include the suit against Ocean State, the demoli-
tion company, to recover the premiums under conversion and unjust enrich-
ment. Id. The claims against Insurance House are irrelevant for the purposes
of this discussion.
123. Id. at 401-02.
124. Id. at 402.
125. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
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In accord with the Third Restatement, 126 Rhode Island does
not recognize a claim for unjust enrichment when an enforceable
express or implied-in-fact contract exists between two parties. 127
In fact, the supreme court has noted that "[ijt is well settled that
where there is an express contract between the parties referring to
a subject matter, there can be no implied contract arising by im-
plication of law governing the same subject matter." 28 The reason
for such a limitation, as mentioned above, is the problem of valua-
tion. When a valid contract is operative, the measure of unjust en-
richment must necessarily refer to the contemplated bargain for
value, creating an unnecessary redundancy. 129 Because contract
law is far better equipped to deal with contractual disputes, liabil-
ity in a case where claims for breach and unjust enrichment could
be concurrent should be assigned to contract law. 30
In Rhode Island a party may, in certain circumstances, re-
cover in unjust enrichment for any amount paid or service per-
formed beyond a contemplated bargain, so long as the additional
benefit is not so far beyond the scope of the initial agreement. 131
126. See supra note 28.
127. See Fondedile, S.A. v. C.E. Maguire, Inc., 610 A.2d 87, 97-98 (R.I.
1992); Mehan v. Gershkoff, 230 A.2d 867, 869-70 (R.I. 1967); Cazabat v. Met-
ropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 2000 WL 1910089, *7 (R.I. Super. Ct.
Apr. 24, 2000).
128. Mehan, 230 A.2d at 870; Cazabat, 2000 WL 1910089 at *7. A contract
implied-by-law is synonymous with quasi-contract. As is discussed below,
Rhode Island equates unjust enrichment with quasi-contract, so the court
here is actually saying that an action in unjust enrichment cannot coexist
with a valid express agreement. See infra Part IV. The Court in Fondedile,
S.A. v. C.E. Maguire, Inc. gave the following justification for limiting unjust
enrichment when an agreement is operative: "It would be unjust after execu-
tion of the contract and completion of the work to deprive the [defendant] of
the benefit for which it bargained. If the [defendant] was enriched because it
made a good deal for itself, the enrichment is not unjust." Fondedile, S.A.,
610 A.2d at 98.
129. See supra notes 26, 28.
130. See Kull, supra note 2, at 1209.
131. See Keystone Elevator Co., Inc. v. Johnson & Wales Univ., 2002 WL
169195, *9-10 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 17, 2002). For example, liability in unjust
enrichment probably would not attach if a defendant, under a valid and en-
forceable services contract to repair a plaintiffs roof, paves the plaintiffs
driveway to facilitate access to the roofing job. The paving was not expressly
contemplated within the initial roofing contract, and the conduct is so far be-
yond the scope of a simple roofing job that defendant will most likely be de-
nied recovery in unjust enrichment.
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This rule is in accord with the Third Restatement, which acknowl-
edges that
[i]mportant instances of restitutionary liability do occur
in a contractual context .... These are transactions in
which the defendant's liability to pay for a performance
actually received has not been specified by a contract that
is both valid and enforceable. 132
The point is illustrated in Keystone Elevator Co. v. Johnson &
Wales University,133 where Johnson & Wales hired a general con-
tractor, defendant Agostini Construction Company (ACC), to con-
struct a residence hall, and ACC subsequently employed Keystone
to install two elevators. 34 During the construction, ACC was
forced to pay one of Keystone's parts vendors for a replacement
part because Keystone, alleging dissatisfaction with the vendors'
product and performance, had refused to reimburse the vendor. 35
Eventually, Keystone brought suit against ACC to recover unpaid
overtime hours, and ACC counterclaimed for the payment to Key-
stone's vendor. 13 6 It was uncontroverted that the subcontract as-
signed all liability for payments to Keystone's vendors to
Keystone. 137 The court held Keystone liable to ACC for the vendor
payment, noting that the payment was owed to ACC under an un-
just enrichment theory, even though the subcontract contemplated
that Keystone, rather than ACC, would pay its vendors. 38 In other
words, ACC was not an officious intermeddler when it conferred
the "benefit" on Keystone (i.e., the payment to the vendor for a
necessary part). Keystone had failed to meet its contractual obli-
gation to provide a working elevator in a timely manner. Thus, via
unjust enrichment, ACC was entitled to obtain the replacement
part directly from the vendor and seek reimbursement from Key-
stone for the "benefit" of ACC's payment to the vendor.
132. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, ch.1, § 2, at 16.
133. 2002 WL 169195 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 17, 2002).
134. Id. at *1-2.
135. Id. at *2-3.
136. Id. at *3.
137. Id. at *9.
138. Id. at *10. Indeed the subcontract itself was far from silent as to who
was to incur the costs of third party suppliers; this burden was affirmatively
placed on the plaintiff. Id.
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Rhode Island courts correctly recognize a claim for unjust en-
richment when a contract is void or voidable due to fraud or mis-
representation. 139 The usual remedy in such a case is rescission of
the contract, which retains an element of unjust enrichment. Ka-
lina v. Clarrya0 is illustrative here. Clarry advertised lakefront
property and the Kalinas responded. 14' Clarry sent the Kalinas an
offer to sell along with photographs of the lake and cottage. 4 2 The
Kalinas responded with an offer to purchase and enclosed a
$1,000.00 deposit to hold the property. 43 Clarry then informed the
Kalinas that the photographs she had sent were not actually of
her cottage, and the Kalinas wrote to Clarry telling her to hold the
transaction pending an on-site inspection of the property. 44 The
Kalinas subsequently revoked their offer and asked that their de-
posit be returned, which Clarry failed to do, 45 and the Kalinas
brought an action for restitution in the amount of the deposit. The
trial court awarded the Kalinas the amount of the deposit along
with a punitive award of $350.00. The supreme court upheld the
judgment for restitution, but reversed the punitive award. 146 Li-
139. When an agreement is void or voidable because assent was obtained
by fraud or misrepresentation, the induced party may avoid the contract typi-
cally through rescission. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.15, at
260-61 (3d ed. 1999). To rescind a contract in an action at law, most jurisdic-
tions require that the rescinding party first tender her consideration for the
agreement before she is entitled to restitution. See id. at 263. Rhode Island,
as well, recognizes tender as a prerequisite to obtaining restitution under re-
scission. See Cruickshank v. Griswold, 104 A.2d 551, 553 (R.I. 1954) ("[Iln ac-
tions at law based upon the rescission of contracts, the general rule is that
such rescission must be complete, and the adverse party, whether plaintiff or
defendant, placed in status quo, before the bringing of the action or assertion
of the defense.").
140. 276 A.2d 280 (R.I. 1971).
141. Id. at 282.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 281, 282-83. Obviously the availability of punitive damages in
tort actions - usually limited to when a tortfeasor acts maliciously, willfully
or wantonly - adds yet another dimension to the unjust enrichment calculus.
For instance, it is conceivable that although an action in unjust enrichment
may yield more than a tort claim (in the presence of conscious wrongdoing),
the behavior of the tortfeasor may be such that the availability of punitive
damages on top of the tort award may still exceed recovery for defendant's
gain in unjust enrichment. The relationship between punitive awards and
unjust enrichment, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
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ability in unjust enrichment is appropriate here as ancillary to the
action for rescission because once the Kalinas revoked their offer
to purchase, Clarry retained the deposit amount while the Kalinas
held nothing in consideration. 147
Rhode Island's jurisprudence tracks the Third Restatement
with fair accuracy at the intersection of unjust enrichment and
contract liability. Rhode Island courts explicitly defer to contract
law to determine liability in the presence of an express or implied-
in-fact contract. Further, Rhode Island courts appropriately use
unjust enrichment to allow a plaintiff to recover benefits exceed-
ing the scope of a valid contract, assuming the added benefits are
reasonably within the scope of the initial agreement. Finally,
Rhode Island properly uses unjust enrichment to afford plaintiffs
a remedy if a contract to which they are a party is void or void-
able.
E. Tracing Property and Proceeds in Rhode Island
Recall that unjust enrichment allows recovery of defendant's
gain in excess of plaintiffs loss;148 constructive trust is the tool
used to obtain any amount exceeding the initial benefit. The typi-
cal unjust enrichment claim often involves an easily ascertainable
damage amount, and thus a specific pecuniary award is an appro-
priate remedy. This mode of recovery, however, can be frustrated
in some situations. Money damages may be inappropriate when
the amount in question is not readily determinable, or is entirely
unascertainable. Furthermore, a plaintiff may prefer to acquire an
interest in the property that is the basis for a claim in unjust en-
richment rather than its monetary equivalent. Such scenarios
would require the imposition of a constructive trust; an equitable
rather than legal remedy. The Third Restatement categorizes con-
structive trust as a proprietary remedy, aptly illustrating its pur-
pose: to trace whatever comprised the basis of the unjust
enrichment claim and afford a plaintiff a proprietary right in its
present manifestation. 149
147. It is evident from this situation, however, that if the defendant had
realized a profit from the deposit, rescission alone may not have allowed the
plaintiffs to recover defendant's gain. For this reason, an action in unjust en-
richment may be the preferred means of recovery here.
148. See supra Part II.B.2.
149. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, ch.1, § 4, at 28-3 1.
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In Rhode Island, "a constructive trust is a relationship im-
posed by operation of law as a remedy to redress a wrong or pre-
vent an unjust enrichment."150 As such, a constructive trust may
be imposed regardless of the intent of the parties. 15' Because con-
structive trust is a remedy, a prerequisite to its imposition is proof
of unjust enrichment.52 To successfully establish a constructive
trust, a plaintiff must prove either fraud or breach of a fiduciary
duty or confidential relationship,153 and each must be proved by
150. Simpson v. Dailey, 496 A.2d 126, 128 (R.I. 1985) ("The underlying
principle of a constructive trust is the equitable prevention of unjust enrich-
ment of one party at the expense of another .... "); see also Renaud v. Ewart,
712 A.2d 884, 885 (R.I. 1998) (same); Clark v. Bowler, 623 A.2d 27, 30 (R.I.
1993) ("[A] constructive trust arises when a person who holds title to property
is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another if the holder of that
property would be unjustly enriched if he or she were permitted to retain it.")
(citing Desnoyers v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 272 A.2d 683 (1971)); Bourque
v. Goodwin, 1999 WL 813655, *3 (R.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 6, 1999) ("A construc-
tive trust is imposed by operation of law as a remedy to redress a wrong or
prevent an unjust enrichment.") (citing Curato v. Brain, 715 A.2d 631, 634
(R.I. 1998)).
151. See Simpson, 496 A.2d at 128 ("The device of a constructive trust can
be employed independently of the intent of the parties."). Because actual in-
tent is not an issue in determining whether constructive trust is appropriate,
evidence proving its necessary elements is adduced by considering the total-
ity of the circumstances surrownding an agreement. Thus, "parol evidence of
the agreement is admissible to prove unjust enrichment," and any proof of a
contract is incidental. Therefore, "where the plaintiff is not attempting to es-
tablish, challenge, or modify the terms of the contract, neither the parol-
evidence rule nor the best-evidence rule is applicable." Id.; see also In re Es-
tate of Hart, 1993 WL 853837, *3-4 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 12, 1993) (holding
that a constructive trust in real property is not within the statute of frauds).
152. See Grotta v. Grotta, 2002 WL 31324109, *1 (R.I. Super. Ct. Sept. 20,
2002) (noting that in a prior bench decision the plaintiff was denied imposi-
tion of a constructive trust, but was awarded $61,865.00 on an unjust en-
richment claim); Sullivan v. Connor, 2001 WL 1685594, *2 (R.I. Super. Ct.
Dec. 18, 2001) (stating, after denying plaintiffs plea for imposition of a con-
structive trust, that "[tihis decision is not dispositive of claims, if any, the
plaintiff has for unjust enrichment....").
153. See, e.g., Curato v. Brain, 715 A.2d 631, 634 (R.I. 1998) (holding that
imposition of a constructive trust requires proof of fraud or breach of a fiduci-
ary duty); Clark v. Bowler, 623 A.2d 27, 29 (R.I. 1993) (holding that to impose
a constructive trust the plaintiff has the burden of proving breach of a fiduci-
ary relationship or fraud); J. K. Social Club v. J. K. Realty Corp., 448 A.2d
130, 134 (R.I. 1982) (holding that a constructive trust may be imposed by ei-
ther proof of fraud or breach of a fiduciary duty); Coastal Finance Corp. v.
Coastal Finance Corp. of N. Providence, 387 A.2d 1373, 1378 (R.I. 1978) ("In
order for a constructive trust to arise, actual or constructive fraud must be
established... ."); Sullivan v. Connor, 2001 WL 1685594, *1 (R.I. Super. Ct.
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clear and convincing evidence. 54 Where real property is the sub-
ject of an unjust enrichment claim, Rhode Island courts have addi-
tionally recognized the establishment of constructive trust where
"legal title to property was obtained.., by testamentary devise or
intestate succession in exchange for a promise to hold trust."155
When a plaintiff seeks imposition of a constructive trust
stemming from a breach of fiduciary duty or violation of a confi-
dential relationship, the obvious threshold issue is whether such a
duty or relationship ever arose between the parties. 156 In contests
involving individuals rather than corporate entities, a familial re-
lationship, while not dispositive of a fiduciary duty, may be proba-
tive of its existence.' 57 Additional factors bearing on the
development of a fiduciary duty may be the extent of one party's
reliance on the other, whether promises had been made between
the parties, and whether an agency relationship may have devel-
oped between the contestants. 58 In the corporate arena, similar
factors influence whether a fiduciary relationship exists; most sig-
nificantly, however, is that Rhode Island does not consider articles
Dec. 18, 2001) (holding that a plaintiff must prove fraud and/or breach of a
fiduciary duty as a prerequisite to imposition of a constructive trust); Lorene
v. Burdick, 1994 WL 930968, *3 (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 1994) (holding that
imposition of a constructive trust is available only upon proof of fraud or "in
violation of fiduciary or confidential relationship[s] . .. ").
154. See Curato, 715 A.2d at 634 ("The party or parties requesting the im-
position of a constructive trust must establish by clear and convincing evi-
dence the existence of fraud or breach of a fiduciary duty."); Clark, 623 A.2d
at 29 (holding that the burden of proof for fraud or breach of fiduciary duty
for the imposition of constructive trust is by clear and convincing evidence);
J.K Social Club, 448 A.2d at 134 (same); Coastal Finance Corp., 387 A.2d at
1378 (same).
155. Simpson, 496 A.2d at 128; Lorene v. Burdick, 1994 WL 930968, *3
(R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 1994) (quoting Simpson, 496 A.2d at 128).
156. See, e.g., Bourque v. Goodwin, 771 A.2d 900, 901 (R.I. 2001) ("[A]
plaintiff must prove the existence of a fiduciary relationship."). "
157. See Simpson, 496 A.2d at 128; see also Curato, 715 A.2d at 634 (hold-
ing that no fiduciary relationship had arisen between a woman and her step-
daughters).
158. Simpson, 496 A.2d at 129 (noting that in Cahill v. Antionelli, 390
A.2d 936 (R.I. 1936), the court found a fiduciary relationship between a
brother and sister because she "had always looked to her brother for advice,
that the brother had promised but failed to reconvey the property, and that
an agency relationship was created when the sister agreed to let the brother
act on her behalf to clear up certain liens").
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of association determinative of such a duty due to their lack of le-
gal enforceability. 159
Constructive trust may also be available upon proof of a con-
fidential relationship. 160 While Rhode Island has refused to adopt
any bright line requirement for proof of such a relationship,'16 fac-
tors such as "the reliance of one party upon the other, the rela-
tionship of the parties prior to the incidents complained of, the
relative business capacities or lack thereof between the parties,
and the readiness of one party to follow the other's guidance in
complicated transactions" all bear on the issue. 162 Furthermore,
violation of a confidential relationship does not require that a de-
fendant "occupy a position of dominance over a plaintiff."16 3
The elements required to prove fraud for the imposition of a
constructive trust on an individual are indistinguishable from
those components necessary to erect the same for a corporate en-
tity. Claims for proprietary interests in real property, usually aris-
ing from contested intestate orders or conditional conveyances,
require "some element of fraudulent conduct by the person in pos-
session of the property in procuring the conveyance in order for a
constructive trust to arise." 64 Similarly, the law requires both in-
dividuals and corporations to prove actual or constructive fraud in
securing legal title. 65
159. J.K Social Club, 448 A.2d at 134 (holding that a fiduciary relation-
ship had not arisen between a club and an association it formed to purchase
real property because "articles of association do not compose a legally en-
forceable contract," and no additional evidence bearing on such a relationship
was adduced).
160. See Simpson, 496 A.2d at 129.
161. Id. ("There are no hard and fast rules about when a confidential rela-
tionship will be found.").
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Curato v. Brain, 715 A.2d 631, 634 (R.I. 1998).
165. Desnoyers v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 272 A.2d 683, 690 (R.I. 1971);
see also Coastal Finance Corp. v. Coastal Finance Corp. of N. Providence, 387
A.2d 1373, 1378 (R.I. 1978). The court in Desnoyers proceeded to qualify this
rule:
If it can be shown that the transferee procured the conveyance by a
consciously false representation of fact, a constructive trust will be
raised in favor of the transferor. Thus if it is proved that when the
transferee promised to reconvey the property he did not intend to
fulfill his promise, there is more than a mere promise subsequently
broken, there is actual misrepresentation as to the fact of his present
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An important case illustrating these principles of constructive
trust in Rhode Island is Simpson v. Dailey.166 Defendant Kathleen
and her sister-in-law, plaintiff Elizabeth, had purchased matching
annuity contracts with Terrence, Elizabeth's deceased husband,
using gift money from Kathleen and Terrence's dying mother.167
Kathleen named Terrence primary beneficiary of her contract,
and, as a reciprocal gesture, Terrence named Kathleen the same,
but added Elizabeth as a contingent beneficiary. 168 While Kath-
leen maintained that upon Terrence's death she was to retain the
proceeds from the annuity as consideration for taking care of their
ailing mother, Elizabeth alleged that Terrence had represented
that if he predeceased Kathleen, the monies were to go to Eliza-
beth and the children.169 Kathleen retained the proceeds from Ter-
rence's annuity, and Elizabeth brought suit seeking to impose a
constructive trust upon those proceeds. 170 The trial court found in
favor of Elizabeth, establishing a constructive trust on the pro-
ceeds of the disputed contract. 171
The Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the trial court's rul-
ing, relying primarily on the existence of a fiduciary relationship
between Kathleen and Terrence. 172 Because Terrence had "com-
plete trust and confidence" in his sister, that trust was borne of
intention. If this is proved, a constructive trust will be raised in favor
of the transferor.
Desnoyers, 272 A.2d at 690 (citing 1 SCOTT ON TRUSTS, § 44.1, at 251). Con-
structive fraud is defined as an "[ulnintentional deception or misrepresenta-
tion that causes injury to another." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 671 (7th ed.
1999). But see J.K. Social Club v. J.K. Realty Corp., 448 A.2d 130, 134 (R.I.
1982) ("There must be an actual misrepresentation of present intent."). The
court in J.K Social Club limited constructive trust by proof of fraud to only
proof of actual fraud. Id. However, the court finds its support for this proposi-
tion from the same case which the Desnoyers court held that proof of con-
structive fraud would suffice for the imposition of a constructive trust. See id.
(citing Lawrence v. Andrews, 122 A.2d 132, 135-36 (R.I. 1956), to support its
conclusion that only proof of actual fraud will impose a constructive trust);
Desnoyers, 272 A.2d at 690 (citing Lawrence for the proposition that construc-
tive fraud may suffice for constructive trust).
166. 496 A.2d 126 (R.I. 1985).
167. Id. at 127. Terrence and Elizabeth's four children were also named
plaintiffs in this suit. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 127-28.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 128.
172. Id. at 129.
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their relationship to one another, and their familial "relation was
a moving cause in influencing [Terrence] to name his sister as a
primary beneficiary to ensure the future well-being of his family,"
the court concluded that Kathleen owed Terrence a fiduciary
duty.173 Her failure to honor Terrence's wishes constituted a
breach of that relationship, and her retention of the proceeds
stemming from that breach was unjust enrichment. 174 Thus, the
appropriate remedy was the imposition of a constructive trust in
favor of Elizabeth and her children, allowing them to trace the
proceeds of Terrence's annuity to whatever form they ultimately
took, or whatever party eventually controlled them - namely
Kathleen.
The value of constructive trust is evident in Guiliano v. Coz-
zolino.17 5 Guiliano and defendant Cozzolino "orally agreed to asso-
ciate themselves as partners for the purpose of purchasing real
estate, agreeing to share in the payment of taxes thereon and in
the proceeds from the sale thereof."176 Thereafter, the parties split
the cost of four parcels of real estate and recorded title in the
name of Cozzolino. 177 Cozzolino then proceeded to transfer the four
lots to defendants Montellas for $10,000.00 without the consent of
the Guilianos, allegedly "to avoid the continual, harassing phone
calls [defendant] Cozzolino was receiving" from the Montellas' fin-
ancier. 178 The Guilianos brought suit against the Cozzolinos and
Montellas praying the court order title be transferred back to the
partnership; 179 however, it is a claim for unjust enrichment
against the Montellas that is relevant for the purposes of this
Comment.180
After recognizing the enforceability of the oral partnership
agreement, the court then addressed the Guilianos' claim for un-
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. 1992 WL 813595 (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 1992).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at *2.
179. Id.
180. See id. at *9 ("[Ihe defendants Montella argue that they have not
been unjustly enriched by [defendant] Cozzolino's conveyance of land to them
for the sum often thousand (10,000) dollars.").
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just enrichment.181 In light of an appraisal of the undeveloped
property and two offers to purchase the parcel - all significantly
exceeding the $10,000 purchase price - the court concluded that
the Montellas were unjustly enriched by the conveyance. 8 2 As
such, the court ordered title transferred back to the Cozzolinos
"for the benefit of the partnership."18 3
Here the Guilianos were able to trace their property into the
hands of the Montellas via unjust enrichment. The court found
that Cozzolino did not have the authority to transfer the property
under the partnership agreement.l 4 Moreover, the court held that
the Montellas were not bona fide purchasers for value because the
amount they actually paid for the property was so disproportion-
ate to its actual value. 8 5 Thus, the Montellas held the property in
constructive trust for the partnership. Had the Montellas been
deemed bona fide purchasers, they would not have been required
to transfer the property back to Cozzolino, and the Guiliano's rem-
edy would have been damages against Cozzolino. Unjust enrich-
ment, manifested in constructive trust, allowed the Guilianos to
trace the property into the hands of the Montellas. It is imperative
to recognize that recovery of the property in this case is likely pre-
ferred since damages would probably be measured by the prop-
erty's fair market value on the date of the conveyance. Since the
appraisals and offers to purchase admitted into evidence indicate
an increasing property value, reacquisition of the property itself is
more attractive.
181. Id. at *7. By finding the oral partnership agreement enforceable, the
subsequent transfer to the Montellas was rendered invalid, requiring the
property be conveyed back to the Guilianos per statute. Id.
182. Id. at *9. It is essential to note that the Montellas insisted the pur-
chase for $10,000 was simply to shield Ralph Montella's sister, Cozzolino,
"from 'harrassment.'" If the court were to accept this argument, it may have
found the express agreement between Cozzolino and the Montellas a product
of duress, causing the unjust enrichment claim to trump any cause of action
in contract. However, the court specifically noted despite Montella's conten-
tion, that it "[found] that this sale between siblings involving 'undeveloped'
partnership property would have unjustly enriched Mr. Montella." Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at *7.
185. See id. at *9.
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IV. CONFUSION ABOUT TERMINOLOGY
Rhode Island courts have consistently held that "'actions
brought upon theories of unjust enrichment and quasi-contract
are essentially the same."18 6 The courts will often invoke a quasi-
contractual analysis when a plaintiff brings a claim solely for un-
just enrichment. 187 Indeed, the elements required to prove an ac-
tion in quasi-contract and a claim for unjust enrichment are
identical under Rhode Island law.188 Collectively, this overlap in-
dicates that Rhode Island jurisprudence may not recognize a legal
distinction between quasi-contract and unjust enrichment.
186. Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670, 673 (R.I. 1997) (quoting R & B Elec-
tric Co., Inc. v. AMCO Construction Co., 471 A.2d 1351, 1355 (R.I. 1984));
State v. Lead Industries Ass'n, 2001 WL 345830, *14-15 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr.
2, 2001) (same); see also Anthony Corrado, Inc. v. Menard & Co. Building
Contractors, 589 A.2d 1201, 1201 (R.I. 1991); Hauser v. Davis, 2000 WL
1910031, *4 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 21, 2000) ("Unjust enrichment claims usu-
ally arise out of implied contracts.").
187. See, e.g., Bouchard, 694 A.2d at 672-73 ("The plaintiffs next contend
that the trial justice erred by dismissing their claim for unjust enrichment.
This Court has held that actions brought upon theories of unjust enrichment
and quasi-contract are essentially the same."); Lead Industries, 2001 WL
345830 at *14-15 (recognizing a claim only for unjust enrichment, yet noting
that "actions brought upon theories of unjust enrichment and quasi-contract
are essentially the same"); Hauser, 2000 WL 1910031 at *4 ("Count VII pur-
ports to allege a claim of unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment claims usu-
ally arise out of implied contracts.").
188. In Harritos v. Cambio, the court noted the following:
To prevail on a claim for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must show
(1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appre-
ciation by the defendant of the benefit; and (3) acceptance of such
benefit under such circumstances that it would be inequitable for the
defendant to retain the benefit without paying for it.
1996 WL 936906, *5 (R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 1996) (citing Landmark Medical
Center v. Gauthier, 635 A.2d 1145, 1148-49 (R.I. 1994)). However, the case
which the Harritos court cites for this proposition, Landmark Medical Center,
articulated the following as its rule:
In order to prove a quasi-contract it must be shown that: (1) the
plaintiff conferred a benefit upon the defendant, (2) the defendant
appreciated the benefit, and (3) under the circumstances it would be
inequitable for the defendant to retain such benefit without payment
of the value thereof.
635 A.2d at 1148-49 (emphasis added). Therefore, at least the Harritos court
does not recognize any substantive distinction between an action in quasi-
contract and a claim for unjust enrichment.
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The term quasi-contract was introduced to alleviate confusion
pervading the distinction between contract implied-in-law and
contract implied-in-fact. 189 Apparently, courts had difficulty iden-
tifying the factual circumstances calling for application of either
type of non-express agreement. 190 Quasi-contract was meant to
displace contract implied-in-law, but courts have been unwilling to
let contract implied-in-law fade away, thereby leaving all three
terms simultaneously operative. 191 Just as confusion continues be-
tween contract implied-in-law and contract implied-in-fact, it is
now common between quasi-contract and contract implied-in-
fact.192
To illustrate this point, consider K & K Construction, Inc. v.
City of Warwick. 93 The City of Warwick had implemented a mu-
nicipal program to assist homeowners in updating their septic sys-
189. See ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.20, at 64 (re-
vised ed. 1993); see also WILLIAM A. KEENER, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF QUASI-
CONTRACTS, 7 (1893). The evolution of the term quasi-contract is complex. It
has its origins in Roman Law, but our modern formulation of a claim for
quasi-contract was first recognized in the law courts of England in the seven-
teenth century. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.20 (3d ed. 1999).
Lord Mansfield subsequently annunciated the legal basis for the modern ac-
tion for quasi-contract as unjust enrichment: "that the defendant, upon the
circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity
to refund the [benefit]." Moses v. MacFerlan, 97 Eng. Rep. 676, 681 (1760).
Indeed, the notion of unjust enrichment as liability for restitution being its
own substantive body of law did not officially appear until publication of the
First Restatement of restitution. See generally RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF
RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS (1936). Thus,
quasi-contract was the only available means for resolving disputes where
parties otherwise lacked civil recourse.
The difference between a legally implied contract and one implied from
the facts of the case is actually quite stark. See FARNSWORTH, supra § 3.10, at
132-33 ("[A] contract that results from words is described as 'express,' while
one that results from conduct is described as 'implied in fact,' but the distinc-
tion as such has no legal consequences."). Because there is no legal distinc-
tion between an express contract and a contract implied-in-fact, a contract
implied-in-fact necessarily requires assent to be valid. See id. However,
quasi-contractual obligations usually arise "without any expression of assent
and sometimes even against a clear expression of dissent." CORBIN, supra
§1.20, at 64.
190. See KEENER, supra note 189, 8-10.
191. See, e.g., K & K Construction, Inc. v. City of Warwick, 693 A.2d 1038,
1039 (R.I. 1997).
192. See, e.g., id.
193. 693 A.2d 1038 (R.I. 1997).
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tems.194 The program would loan a prospective patron sixty per-
cent of the purchase price for a new system and pay the patron the
additional forty percent as a grant to the eventual contractor. 195
The city accepted an application from the O'Briens', and K&K was
the low bidder for the septic job. 196 The O'Briens were dissatisfied
with the condition in which K&K left their yard upon installation,
so they repaid the City the sixty percent loan amount, and with-
held the forty percent grant meant for K&K.197 K&K sued the City
and the O'Briens for breach of contract.198 The trial justice in-
structed the jury on the elements of breach of contract, and also on
an alternative theory of quasi-contract or unjust enrichment. 99
The jury found in favor of K&K for the full cost of the job.200 In
upholding the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial to the
O'Briens, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held the following:
[Wie believe that the jury could reasonably infer that an
implied contract or a quasi-contract had been formed be-
tween the O'Briens and K & K and that the value of that
contract was $5,000 or alternatively that K & K should
recover this amount under an unjust enrichment the-
ory.201
The problem here does not lie with the trial justice's jury
charge. In fact, the trial justice accurately conveyed the law by
recognizing that quasi-contract and unjust enrichment were to-
gether alternative claims to breach of contract. The supreme
court's characterization of the claims, however, is misleading. It
equated implied contract with quasi-contract, 2 2 and then stated
that the alternative claim in unjust enrichment was viable. Even
assuming the supreme court's reference to implied contract meant
contract implied-in-law, the court's own jurisprudence seems to re-
194. Id. at 1038.
195. Id. at 1038-39.
196. Id. at 1039.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. This claim is not entirely incorrect. While the term "implied contract"
commonly refers to a contract implied-in-fact, Black's Law Dictionary defines
"implied contract" as "1. An implied-in-law contract," or "2. An implied-in-fact
contract." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 322 (7th ed. 1999).
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fute the assertion that quasi-contract and unjust enrichment are
alternative causes of action.203 Certainly the fact that unjust en-
richment is the basis for a claim in quasi-contract forecloses such
a position. It is precisely these subtleties between terms that tend
to lead courts astray.
Supplanting quasi-contract with the language of unjust en-
richment would cure this linguistic confusion. The modern formu-
lation of unjust enrichment has effectively swallowed quasi-
contract. Unjust enrichment is broader than quasi-contract, ex-
tending to actions beyond the reach of contract implied-in-law.204
Since unjust enrichment can accommodate all claims in quasi-
contract and has applications exceeding the scope of quasi-
contract, quasi-contract adds nothing to the law that unjust en-
richment cannot provide; its existence is superfluous.
More importantly, however, quasi-contract's mere existence
inhibits the development of unjust enrichment as an independent,
substantive body of law. In a jurisdiction such as Rhode Island,
where the law does not discern any substantive distinction be-
tween the two, the designation of either term to resolve a dispute
premised on unjust enrichment liability becomes arbitrary. The
reasonable inference to be drawn from such a capricious assign-
ment of liability is that unjust enrichment cannot provide any-
thing more than quasi-contract. As illustrated previously, this
conclusion clearly is erroneous.
V. CONCLUSION
Unjust enrichment is the basis of liability for and the meas-
urement of recovery in restitution. The law of unjust enrichment
is a substantive body of law independent from, and parallel to,
contract and tort. It offers several advantages, such as a mode of
recourse when recovery in contract or tort are lacking, the avail-
ability of disgorgement of profits, and the ability to trace and re-
cover property or proceeds that have either changed form or have
been subsequently transferred to a third party. As such, the law of
203. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
204. Recall that since quasi-contract was historically comprised of causes
of action founded upon unjust enrichment liability, quasi-contract cannot
constitute more than a subset of the law of unjust enrichment or restitution.
See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. Consequently, the modern for-
mulation of unjust enrichment necessarily supplants quasi-contract.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
unjust enrichment is a necessary element for a complete system of
civil liability in any jurisdiction.
To ensure the development and success of unjust enrichment
the term quasi-contract should be stricken from the modern legal
vocabulary. Only upon the elimination of quasi-contract can un-
just enrichment achieve its rightful status as an independent,
substantive body of law, capable of affording all litigants in a
given jurisdiction the full panoply of its advantages. The elimina-
tion of quasi-contract will not deprive the law of a necessary tool
to resolve certain disputes. In fact, as illustrated above, quasi-
contract is a superfluous legal fiction premised upon unjust en-
richment liability from its inception, and now completely swal-
lowed by the law of unjust enrichment.
The elimination of quasi-contract from the legal vocabulary
will put courts and advocates alike on notice that any claim based
on liability for unjust enrichment should be pleaded as a claim for
unjust enrichment. This will effectively eliminate any confusion in
pleading, and draw a definitive line of demarcation between con-
tract law, tort law, and the law of unjust enrichment. Finally, us-
ing the language of unjust enrichment rather than quasi-contract
will make plain that a plaintiff is entitled to disgorgement of the
defendant's profits under a claim for unjust enrichment in the
presence of conscious wrongdoing.
Todd Barton205
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